The debate on privatising the war in Afghanistan is heating up yet again, with Democratic lawmakers pledging to end so-called “forever wars.” The public is slowly recognising the war’s hidden costs and global scale.

In 2016, one in four US armed personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan was a private contractor. This means that the war is already being outsourced, yet scholars, the media and the general public know almost nothing about it.

Who are the contractors who actually execute American policy? Are they equipped to succeed in this important task? What risks is the US asking them to take?

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The simple truth is that there is little reliable data about this industry. Without this data, scholars cannot ask even the most basic questions of whether using contractors works better than the alternative, namely military personal or local forces – or, indeed, whether it works at all.

We are researchers who study the privatisation of security and its implications. In our study, published on 5 December in Armed Forces & Society, we shed light on some of the aspects of this largely invisible workforce for the first time.

Gaps in the Data

It’s hard to get data about private military contractors, mainly because of the proprietary business secrets.

Given how centrally private military companies feature in American foreign policy debates lately, Americans may assume that their policymakers are working from a detailed understanding of the contractor workforce.

After all, the point is to weigh the contractors’ merits against uniformed service members, about whom the public have excellent information.

But this does not appear to be the case. There isn’t a detailed account of the private military industry’s practices, workforce, misconducts or contracts. Noticing this gap, in 2008, Congress instructed the Department of Defence to start collecting data on private security personnel.

However, this data is limited, as security contractors comprise just 10 to 20 percent of DOD contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. The rest provide mission essential functions, such as engineering, communication and transportation and many others.

Since it is impossible to say anything directly about the total population of American and British contractors who have served in Iraq, we sought out a sample for which records do exist – namely, those who died and whose deaths were recorded in obituaries. They are the corporate war dead.

They are not a representative sample, since some occupations and some personalities are more likely to risk death in combat than others, but in a setting without any reliable information they offer us a glimpse to this industry’s workforce.

Basic Demographics

We collected open source data from iCasualties, a site that collects basic data on soldiers and contractors casualties. Using this data we gathered demographic information from obituaries and news articles, on 238 contractors who perished in Iraq between 2006 and 2016.

We learned that the contractors in our sample are predominantly white man in their 40s who choose contracting as a second career. Most are veterans with significant military experience.

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Among those contractors who were previously deployed as service members, many are former officers and about half of them are Special Forces veterans.

They come from parts of the US or United Kingdom with higher unemployment rates and fewer job opportunities – not the areas with the strongest traditions for military service.

How Contractors Died

What was it like to be a contractor in Iraq? From our sample of the corporate war dead, most of their deployments were short, between a week to a month. Many contractors treated it as a temporary job, taking a few tours.

Most of those in our sample worked in security, an especially dangerous job. Indeed, these contractors were more likely to be killed by enemy action than the American service members they worked alongside.

Of course, all of the members of our sample died. Contractors faced mortal peril in different places than service members. Many more of them died in Baghdad or on the roads than did at work or on a base.

This makes sense, considering that contractors that often lacked a protective umbrella of support from other units. If encountering unexpected threats, their support was less organised and effective.

They were also routinely tasked with different types of missions: less combat work, and more logistics, maintenance or security type work. These types of missions – for example, driving the supply trucks to and from a base – are less protected and have routines that can be detected by insurgents.

Enriching the Debate

To make informed decisions about whether and how to privatise future military commitments, the public needs at least a general understanding of the people tasked with projecting American force abroad.

The corporate war dead of future conflicts will almost certainly include Americans who previously served their country honourably in uniform. Their lives should be viewed as no more expendable as contractors than as soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines.

Our contribution to the ongoing debate on contractors is important, but modest. Our sample represents less than a quarter of the private military contractors’ total population. The public still knows almost nothing about military contractors or the organisations they are affiliated with.

Contractors’ variation in experience, training and capabilities is broad and not well understood. Most contractors are not Westerners, but rather third country nationals, recruits from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many others are veterans from other countries, such as Peru, Colombia, Fiji and Uganda. Some bring less institutional experience, as the industry recruits former child soldiers from Sierra Leone and ex-guerrilla fighters from the FARC.

Some very big questions still lack any answer at all. Are contractors better or worse than service members in achieving a country’s political ends abroad? Is the US using them effectively, making the most of what they do offer and mitigating those areas where they fall short?

Private military and security companies do not have real incentive to share these data, but the public interest is clear: The public needs it.

(This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article here.)

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